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Abstract—SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) is proposed to 
counter IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) security 
threats. However, SEND is compute-intensive. Fulfilling Hash2 
condition in Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) is 
the main heavy part of SEND. Unfortunately, CGA computation 
cannot see significant speed improvement when it runs on 
multicore machine because CGA generation algorithm is 
sequential. In this paper, we propose a multicore-based high 
performance SEND implementation for Windows families to 
speed up SEND computations. The proposed approach 
automatically detects the number of processors available on a 
machine and creates equivalent number of working threads to 
compute Hash2 condition. The parallelization mechanism is 
implemented to assign CGA computation to all the cores. When 
one thread satisfies CGA Hash2 condition, the others stop. With 
the parallel approach, the speedup time has been increased 
extremely by increasing the number of cores in the computing 
device. Besides the parallelization, we extend SEND 
implementation to generate the key pair for CGA algorithm on-
the-fly to enhance the security and to protect the privacy. 
Keywords-SEND implementation; Cryptographically Generated 
Addresses (CGA); Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP); IPv6 
security and protection; parallel computing 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [1] is as an extension 
to Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) [2, 3]. SEND uses RSA 
key pairs, Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) [4], 
digital signature and X.509 certification to offer significant 
protection to NDP. SEND offers the address ownership proof, 
message integrity and router authorization mechanism. 
Unfortunately, SEND is computationally heavy especially 
for high security level requirements. The sequential brute-force 
search loop to fulfill Hash2 condition [4] in CGA generation 
algorithm is the main compute-intensive part of SEND. It may 
take several hours or even days to find CGA parameters with 
security level “2”. This long delay is unacceptable in several 
applications. 
Nowadays, multicore processors greatly increase the 
computational capacity of computers and become standard. 
Nearly every computer has a processor with at least two cores. 
Some desktops have up to 8 CPUs. These CPU numbers are 
likely to increase in the future. Multicore processor offers the 
opportunities for remarkable speed improvement in CGA 
computation. However, a dual-core processor does not double 
CGA computation performance automatically, because CGA 
generation algorithm is sequential process and not fully utilized 
the available CPU cores. The conventional implementation of 
CGA does not take full advantage when it runs on a multicore 
machine. Therefore, exploiting the computational resources of 
the existing cores requires CGA generation algorithm 
improvement to run in parallel. So, it is critical that CGA 
implementation scale with the number of cores. 
In this paper, we will introduce an approach for multicore 
device to achieve better performance for SEND computations. 
We extend Windows SEcure Neighbor Discovery (WinSEND) 
[5] implementation to do the brute-force search to find a valid 
modifier in parallel rather than do it sequentially. Based on the 
number of cores on the computing device, the extended version 
of WinSEND determines the number of parallel threads to 
compute CGA address parameters. The parallel WinSEND 
version reduces the CGA generation time drastically. The 
experiment results are validated and evaluated by comparing 
the performance of the proposed approach with the 
conventional approach. Besides, we extend WinSEND to 
generate the key pair for CGA algorithm on-the-fly. Generating 
the keys in spot increase the randomness of CGA addresses and 
enhances its security against brute force attack and protects the 
users’ privacy. 
The paper is structured in the following manner. An 
overview of NDP and possible attacks against it is presented in 
Section II. Section III shows how SEND can protect NDP and 
provides more details about CGA generation algorithm. 
Section IV explains the details of parallelization of SEND 
implementation and shows new extensions which is added to 
WinSEND implementation. The experimental results are 
demonstrated in Section V. The last section concludes the 
work. 
II. NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY PROTOCOL (NDP) 
Neighbor Discovery (ND) for IPv6 [2] and IPv6 Stateless 
Address Auto-Configuration (SLAAC) [3], together, are 
referred to as IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP). NDP 
is one of the main protocols in IPv6 suite. It greatly improves 
the efficiency and the network management. It is heavily used 
for several critical functionalities, such as discovering other 
existing nodes on the same link, determining others’ link layer 
addresses, detecting duplicate addresses, finding routers and 
maintaining reachability information about paths to active 
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neighbors. Moreover, NDP plays a crucial role in mobile IPv6 
(MIPv6) networks. In MIPv6, the SLAAC and ND features 
eliminate the need for Foreign Agents (FAs), and a Mobile 
Node (MN) can join to a new foreign network by receiving the 
Router Advertisements (RAs) [6]. 
NDP has only basic protection mechanisms to ensure that 
the messages come from nodes that directly connect to a local 
link. ND accepts messages which come from nodes with either 
unspecified or link-local IPv6 addresses and with hop limit 
255. However, this protection shield is not enough to protect 
IPv6 local networks. If NDP messages left without 
authentication mechanism, it will be vulnerable to a set of 
attacks. IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) Trust Models and 
threats, RFC3756 [7], describes these attacks. The attacker can 
carry out several attacks based on address resolution, redirect, 
Duplicate Address Detection (DAD), Router Advertisement 
(RA), and address configuration. For instance, it is easy to 
configure a rogue router on the link, and it is difficult for the 
host to validate the authorized router. 
In addition the security weakness, StateLess Address Auto-
Configuration (SLAAC) leads to privacy implications. Since 
generating the interface identifier from the MAC address of the 
node (which remains constant over time) makes it possible to 
track a node over the Internet. Also, SLAAC make it easy to 
correlate the traffic patterns and the activities to the certain user 
[8]. 
III. SECURE NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY (SEND) 
A. SEND Options and Messages 
SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [1] is a set of 
enhancements to NDP. SEND offers three additional features 
to NDP:  Address ownership proof, message protection and 
router authorization mechanism. To achieve these 
enhancements, SEND comes with four new options: CGA, RSA 
Signature, Timestamp, and Nonce options.  
1. CGA Option: this field carries the associated 
parameters to enable the receiver to validate the proper 
binding between the owner public key and the 
Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA).  
2. RSA Signature Option: this option is used to 
authenticate the identity of the sender. The message 
which is sent from CGA address is signed with the 
address owner private key and the public key is used to 
verify the signature. This signature prevents an attacker 
from spoofing NDP messages. 
3. Nonce Option: this option is used to protect messages 
from replay attacks, and to ensure that an 
advertisement is a fresh response to a solicitation 
which is sent earlier by the node. 
4. Timestamp Option: this option is used to protect the 
unsolicited advertisements (periodic RA and Redirect 
messages) from replay attacks. 
SEND uses an Authorization Delegation Discovery (ADD) 
process to validate and authorize IPv6 routers to act as default 
gateways, and specifies the IPv6 prefixes that a router is 
authorized to announce on the link [1]. ADD relies on an 
electronic certificate issued by a trusted third party. Before any 
node can accept a router as its default router, the node must be 
configured with a trust anchor(s) that can certify the router via 
certificate paths. Thus, the node requests the “router” to 
provide its X.509 certificate path to a Trust Anchor (TA) which 
is preconfigured on the node. The “router” should not be 
trusted if it fails to provide the path to TA. Two new ICMPv6 
discovery messages are offered for identifying the router 
authorization process:  
1. Certificate Path Solicitation (CPS): is sent by hosts 
during the ADD process to request a certification path 
between a router and one of the host’s trust anchors. 
2. Certificate Path Advertisement (CPA): is sent in reply 
to the CPS message and contains the router certificate. 
B. CGA Generation Algorithm 
Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) is an essential 
part of SEND which is proposed to prevent address stealing. It 
offers the authentication to IPv6 addresses without the need of 
the third party or additional security infrastructure. CGAs are 
IPv6 addresses, where the interface identifiers (IIDs) are 
generated by one-way hashing of the node’s public key and 
other auxiliary parameters. Thus, the IPv6 address of a node is 
bound to its public key. This binding can be verified by re-
computing the hash value and being compared with the 
interface identifier of the sender IPv6 address. 
In CGA generation algorithm, the address owner computes 
two independent one-way hash values (Hash1 and Hash2) by 
using the public key and other auxiliary parameters. Hash2 
value sets an input parameter for Hash1. The combination of 
the two hash values increases the computational complexity of 
generating new address and the cost of brute-force attacks. 
A schematic of CGA generation algorithm is shown in 
Figure 1 (refer to RFC 3972 for more details). CGA generation 
begins with determining the address owner’s Public Key 
and selecting the proper Security level (Sec) value. Then 
continue the Hash2 computation loop until finding the Final 
Modifier. Hash2 value is a hash of combination of the 
Modifier and the Public Key is concatenated with zero-
value of Subnet Prefix and Collision Count. The 
address generator tries different values of the Modifier until 
16×Sec-leftmost-bits of Hash2 computes to zero. Once a match 
is found, the loop for Hash2 computation terminates. 
Afterward, the Final Modifier value is saved and used as an 
input for Hash1 computation. Hash1 value is a hash of 
combination of the whole CGA parameter data structure. Then, 
the interface identifier (IID) is derived from Hash1. The Sec 
value is encoded into the three leftmost bits of the interface 
identifier. The 7th and 8th bits from the left of IID are reserved 
for special purpose (Refer to RFC 3513 for more details). 
Finally, the Duplicated Address Detection (DAD) is done to 
ensure that there is no address collision within the same subnet.  
The main disadvantage of using CGA is the computational 
cost. CGA computations may take long time especially for high 
“Sec” value. In fact, satisfying Hash2 condition is the most 
computational expensive part of CGA generation algorithm. 
Multiple hashes are computed over the CGA parameter data 
structure which is slightly modified each time the modifier 
value at once. One approach to speedup CGA computations is 
to parallelize CGA algorithm. 
C. Parallelization of CGA Generation Algorithm 
CGA generation is a sequential algorithm. Therefore, the 
main challenge of CGA parallelization is to break down CGA 
algorithm in parallel and assemble it to find the final results. To 
parallelize CGA algorithm, two things should be determined: 
which part of CGA algorithm should be parallelized and to 
how many parallel process it should be broken. Hash2 
condition needs to be broken to number of threads because it is 
the heaviest part of CGA. To utilize all cores on a device, the 
number of threads is determined based on the number of CPU 
cores. In this way, the CGA generation algorithm can scale its 
performance based on the available CPU cores. It is important 
to understand that using two processors do not double the 
speed. Parallel processing causes some level of overhead, the 
resources used to manage the multiple processors. 
IV. PARALLELIZED SEND IMPLEMENTATION 
We implement SEND parallel mode by extending Windows 
SEcure Neighbor Discovery (WinSEND) [5] implementation.  
More details about WinSEND implementation and the 
extensions to achieve the parallelization and other features are 
shown in the following subsections.  
A. WinSEND Implementation Overview 
WinSEND has been developed in Microsoft .NET as a 
service to provide security for Windows NDP. WinSEND is 
proposed as a response to the lack of SEND implementation in 
Windows XP/Vista/7 [11]. While Windows family is the most 
popular operating system and accounts for more than 80% of 
usage compared to other operating systems [12]. It uses 
WinPcap library [9] rather than Winsock to transfer data 
between network interface card (NIC) to upper layers and vice 
versa. WinSEND has direct access to raw sockets which offers 
the possibility for an application to receive/send network traffic 
before processing it by the normal TCP/IP stack. 
WinSEND is subdivided into 3 main components: User 
Interface, WinSEND Service and Main Classes. Figure 2 
shows WinSEND components and the relationship between 
them. WinSEND Main Classes is a shared component that is 
called by both WinSEND Service and User Interface. Users 
can select their desired parameters such as security level (Sec 
value), cryptosystem, key size and network interface card 
which will be secured by WinSEND. These configuration 
parameters are stored in an XML file format for further usage. 
This XML file contains SEND options such as the “subnet 
prefix”, “Sec” value and key pair (public/private keys). The 
reason for storing CGA parameters is to skip CGA generation 
process while a node is connected to the same network or the 
address is still valid. The address becomes invalid once the 
node joins a new subnet or the valid time is elapsed. For 
generating new CGA addresses, WinSEND reruns all CGA 
generation processes automatically and update the XML file. 
WinSEND uses netsh [10] command to disable the NDP 
messages (auto-configuration, router discovery, and etc) from 
normal TCP/IP stack. In this way, the exchange of NDP 
message is forced to be handled by WinSEND in secure 
manner. 
B. WinSEND Parallel Computing Mode Implementation   
WinSEND is extended to do the brute-force search to 
satisfy Hash2 condition of CGA algorithm in parallel. In 
parallel computational mode, the extended WinSEND can use 
almost the whole CPU capacity to finish CGA computations. 
When the extended WinSEND starts, it reads the number of 
CPU cores and base on the number of existing cores, 
WinSEND determines the number of parallel tasks which can 
be used for CGA computations.  
Figure 3 shows how CGA generation can be parallelized to 
use n-core computing device. In this approach, each task is run 
in one core to avoid CPU switching among the parallel tasks 
for CGA generation. The Tasks Generator (TG) passes a 
particular continuous sets of modifier for each task, i.e. each 
thread dedicated to do brute-force search for certain range. If 
the thread1 process modifier range from 0 to n, then thread2 
would process for a range of n+1 to 2*n and so on. TG also 
passes termination token to CGA Generation (CGAGen) 
function to control and terminate all tasks when one of the 
tasks succeed to find a valid modifier which fulfills Hash2 
conditions. If none of the tasks successes to find the valid 
 
Figure 1.  CGA generation algorithm. 
Figure 2.  WinSEND main components and its relationships 
modifier within the assigned range, new tasks with new ranges 
of modifiers are generated. 
WinSEND uses some customized classes in Task Parallel 
Library (TPL) [13] to simplify the parallelization management. 
TPL simplifies this process and provides a number of classes 
and methods which allows running a number of jobs in a 
parallel fashion. TPL has Task Factory class [14] that provides 
support for creating and scheduling Task objects without 
sacrificing of their power and flexibility. The following 
mathematic formula shows total time requires meeting Hash2 
condition in CGA sequential and parallelizing algorithm. 
• Sequential CGA algorithm 
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ݐ௦௘௤ = Total time needs for forming the final CGA address 
in sequential mode 
ݐ௢ =  The time needs for other steps in CGA generation 
algorithm, such as RSA key generation, Hash1 calculation, and 
Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) check. 
ݐ௛ଶ௟ = The time needs for computing Hash2 loop. 
݉ = Modifier   
ݎ = The total number of iteration to fulfill Hash2 condition   
•  Parallelize CGA algorithm 
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ݐ௣௔௥ =  Total time needs for processing CGA in parallel 
mode 
݊ =	 Constant number  
ݔ =	 Number of CPU cores  
Nevertheless, the user can change the computational mode 
to sequential mode via the advance setting in WinSEND User 
Interface as shown in Figure 4. In sequential computation 
mode, one instruction is executed per unit of time. The 
sequential WinSEND cannot use the total CPU capacity of all 
cores on a computing device. The default setting of WinSEND 
uses the parallel computational mode. 
C. Key Generation Method 
When WinSEND service runs on a node, it calls 
“KeyGeneration” function that generates key pairs based 
on a user-defined key size automatically (by default 1024-bit). 
Generation the keys in this way has the following advantages: 
• The user requires minimal amount of configuration, no 
need for her/him to know the technical details behind 
the cryptography. 
• No need to use external program to generate the key 
pairs. In practice, it is not easy for the user to generate 
key pairs manually each time the application wants to 
generate new address for the computing device. 
• Keys are not stored in a particular path before starting 
the application. Therefore, the keys are not vulnerable 
to stealing.  
• Generating the key pair on-the-fly each time the 
WinSEND starts CGA process, enhances the CGA 
security and protects the user privacy. Generating the 
public key in this way increases the randomness 
of CGA generated addresses and consequently 
enhances its security against the brute-force attack. 
Moreover, each time the node moves to a new location, 
it gets new CGA address and uses new public key. 
Therefore, it is not easy to track the users based on 
their IPs or even to correlate the traffic to their public 
keys. 
• The average time to generate key pair with RSA key 
1024-bit over 1000 sample cost 27.8 Milliseconds, 
while the average time for CGA generation for Sec 
Figure 3.  Flowchart of the Proposed Parallel CGA generation processing Figure 4.  WinSEND Interface advanced setting 
value “1” and key 1024-bit cost 439.6 Milliseconds. 
So, the key generation takes around 6.3% of the total 
CGA generation time. The measurements are done on a 
computer with 2.6 GHz. Figure 5 shows this average 
time generation mapped to different key sizes.  
• Reading 1024-bit key sizes from a PEM file and 
convert it to a readable format for WinSEND takes 
almost the same time if the key is generated in spot.  
V. EXTENDED WINSEND TESTING 
To evaluate the performance ofCGA generation algorithm 
in parallel mode, several experiments are carried out for 
different system specifications. The experiments are done on a 
computer with 2.60 GHz CPU (8-cores) and 8GB RAM. 
Debian is the main operating system on this computer. We run 
the extended WinSEND on guest Windows 7 (64-bit) hosted by 
Virtualbox4.1.0 software. The settings of VirtualBox offer the 
flexibility to control the number of virtual CPU cores that the 
guest operating systems can use. Because the CGA generation 
is a random process and no guarantees when to stop, the CGA 
address is generated 1000 times to have sufficient samples. All 
the measurements for different number of cores are taken for 
CGA with Sec value “1” and with key size 1024-bit. 
Figure 6 shows the CPU usage for WinSEND parallel and 
sequential modes. In sequential mode, the CPU usage around 
30% while in parallel mode it is around 80% of the total CPU 
capacity. In recent Windows versions (vista, 2008 and 7), 
multi-core CPUs is supported natively and the OS attempts to 
distribute a job (sequential or Parallel) over CPU cores and 
decrease execution time. However, this distribution is not as 
efficient as a developer uses the parallelization techniques in 
the application. In addition, the thread limits affects the 
execution time too. The thread limits in 32-bit and 64-bit 
Windows 7 varies [15] i.e. In 32-bit Windows 7 with 2GB 
RAM, about 2025 concurrent threads can be created while in 
64-bit windows is 54965 threads. Therefore, WinSEND 
sequential mode performs better for 64-bit OS than 32-bit. 
The experimental results show considerable speedup with 
parallel approach, compared to the conventional sequential 
approach. Table 1 shows CGA average generation times for 
parallel and sequential WinSEND. The measurements are taken 
for CGA with Sec value “1” and for RSA public key 1024-bit. 
With 2 cores, the parallel approach speedup CGA computation 
by 27.1%, for 4 cores by 30.5% and for 8 cores by 38.7%. It is 
clear that CGA benefit from increasing the number of cores 
available on a computer in both cases with sequential and 
parallel modes. However, the parallel mode is much better than 
sequential because it tries to invest most of the available CPU 
capacity to do the computations.  
TABLE I.  CGA AVERAGE GENERATION TIME COMPARISON OF 
SEQUENTIAL AND PARALLEL WINSEND 
 
Number  
CPU cores 
CGA average generation time  
(Milliseconds)  
1024-bit RSA key, Sec=1 
 
Percentage 
of Speedup 
Parallel Mode Sequential Mode 
2 376.34 516.26 27.1% 
4 304.13 437.82 30.5% 
8 261.43 426.36 38.7% 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) protocol is proposed 
to counter most of the threats against Neighbor Discovery 
Protocol (NDP). Unfortunately, SEND is compute-intensive 
approach. Since SEND is sequential algorithm, it cannot see 
the advantage automatically when it runs on multicore 
machine. It cannot use all CPU capacity. Therefore, to benefit 
from multicore technology, there is a need to redesign the 
implementation of programs and software to parallelized 
model.  
In this paper, we presented a multicore-based parallel 
computational approach for CGA which is significantly 
improve CGA generation time. This approach can 
automatically scale based on the number of available cores on 
the computing device. The experimental results show 
considerable speedup with CGA generation time in parallel 
mode compare to the sequential approach. The amount of 
speedup achieved depends on how many cores are available. 
This improvement enables the device to have “more secure” 
address within shorter time.  
 
Figure 5.  Average key pair generation time for different key (module) length 
over 1000 samples 
Figure 6.   CPU usage snapshot for 4-cores CPU. Top-WinSEND parallel 
mode; Bottom- WinSEND sequential mode 
Windows SEcure Neighbor Discovery (WinSEND) 
implementation is extended to work in parallel mode. 
WinSEND is developed in Microsoft .NET. It can be installed 
in windows as a service. It has an easy user interface to enable 
the user to set the desired security parameters. WinSEND uses 
WinPcap API to have a direct access to raw sockets and bypass 
normal TCP/IP stack.    
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